**[FRAMEWORK REMOVED]**

**CONTENTION ONE** is an understanding of the causes of domestic violence. Domestic violence is a product of a series of heteropatriarchal discourses that justify and encourage the use of violence to discipline and dominate non-masculine identities. Randall:

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF "IDEAL VICTIMS": ASSAULTED WOMEN'S "IMAGE PROBLEMS" IN LAW, Melanie Randall, University of Pittsburgh Public Law Review 2004

As has been demonstrated by a now significant body of research on the topic, the majority of violence against women takes place in the context of intimate heterosexual relationships, and among its more brutal manifestations, includes repeated physical and sexual assaults.1 8 At the micro level, men's [domestic] violence against women in intimate relationships expresses the greater social power and control they [men] wield; power which is also structured and entrenched at the macro-level of social relations, in terms of their overrepresentation in most positions of power and authority, including in the economic[s] and political [power] spheres. Gendered violence is a phenomenon that emerges from and reinforces women's subordinate status in society.19 This has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in cases including *R. v. Seaboyer,20 Janzen v. Plaly Enterprises,* and *R. v. Osolin.22* As Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 remarked in *Seaboyer,* "perhaps more than any other crime, the fear and constant reality of sexual assault affects how women conduct their lives and how they define their relationship with the larger society."23 In recent years there has been an increasing awareness of the prevalence of violence against women, including the specific problem of "woman abuse ' ' 24 in the context of spousal relationships. 2 5 It has now become an accepted part of much of the mainstream discourse on violence against women, for example, that "power and control" are central explanatory concepts in accounting for this violence.26 Yet the concepts "power and control" can nevertheless run the risk of being understood in overly individualized terms if they are not linked to an analysis of the social relations of gender, specifically of the ways in which [that] this violence expresses the imbalances of power embedded in those social relations of inequality. By this I mean that it is possible to think that the men who perpetrate violence against women are deviant individuals with an unhealthy need for power and control, understood in terms of distortions in their personal psyches. While attention to the factors which make some men act out violence towards women while others do not is of crucial importance, the larger point I am making here is that the problem of men's violence against women is too pervasive to be understood as a pathology of a few individual men. Instead, it must be analysed within the context of the larger patterns of presumed male entitlement, authority, and power constructed in the culture more broadly. The rationalizations used by men who are "batterers" to explain, minimize, or excuse their assaults on their female partners are most telling in this regard for what they reveal about the larger constructs of traditional masculine norms.27 Studying the micropolitics of power, as these are expressed in individual and intimate relationships between men and women, therefore, throws into stark relief the larger patterns of gendered social inequalities and the way in which these shape the conditions of women's lives. The pervasive social problem of violence against women, including sexual assault, sexual harassment, and physical and sexual assault in intimate relationships, exists on an international scale28 and cannot be understood apart from the hierarchical and unequal relations of gender in which it is both situated and of which it is a product. Put differently, violence against women simultaneously expresses and reproduces sexual inequality on both individual and societal levels; it is both a cause and effect of sex inequality.

This is largely because of two separate yet interrelated discourses. The first of these is the assumption that the masculine is defined by rationality and its opposite defined by emotion. This premise is what has helped give masculine identities the birthright to dominate the feminine and this is all pervasive in our moral thinking.

Held Virginia Held, City University of New York Graduate School and Hunter College, “Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 1, Supplemental Issue, 1990

The history of philosophy, including the history of ethics, has been constructed from male points of view, and has been built on assumptions and concepts that are by no[t] means gender-neutral.' Feminists characteristically begin with different concerns and give different emphases to the issues we consider than do non-feminist approaches. And, as Lorraine Code expresses it, "starting points and focal points [which] shape[s] the impact of theoretical discussion."2 Within philosophy, feminists often start with, and focus on, quite different issues than those found in standard philosophy and ethics, however "standard" is understood. Far from providing mere additional insights which can be incorporated into traditional theory, feminist explorations often require radical transformations of existing fields of inquiry and theory. From a feminist point of view, moral theory along with almost all theory will have to be transformed to take adequate account of the experience of women. I shall in this paper begin with a brief examination of how various fun-damental aspects of the history of ethics have not been gender-neutral. And I shall discuss three issues where feminist rethinking is transforming moral concepts and theories. The History of Ethics. Consider the ideals embodied in the phrase "the man of reason." As Genevieve Lloyd has told the story, what has been taken to characterize the man of reason may have changed from historical period to historical characteristic of the feminine. "Rationality," Lloyd writes, "has been conceived as transcendence of the 'feminine,' and the 'feminine' itself has been partly constituted by its occurrence within this structure." This has of course fundamentally affected the history of philosophy and of ethics. The split between reason and emotion is one of the most familiar of philosophical conceptions. And the advocacy of reason "controlling" unruly emotion, of rationality [and] guiding responsible human action against the blindness of passion, has a long and highly influential history, almost as familiar to non-philosophers as to philosophers. We should certainly now be alert to the ways in which [R]eason has been associated with male endeavor, emotion with female weakness, and the ways in which this is of course not an accidental association. As Lloyd writes, "From the beginnings of philosophical thought, femaleness was symbolically associated with what Reason supposedly left behind - the dark powers of the earth goddesses, immersion in unknown forces associated with mysterious female powers. The early Greeks saw women's capacity to conceive as connecting them with the fertility of Nature. As [Since] Plato later expressed the thought, women 'imitate the earth."'5 Reason, in asserting its claims and winning its status in human history, was thought to have to conquer the female forces of Unreason. Reason and clarity of thought were early associated with maleness, and as Lloyd notes, "what had to be shed in developing culturally prized rationality was, from the start, symbolically associated with femaleness."6 In later Greek philosophical thought, the form/matter distinction was articulated, and with a similar hierarchical and gendered association. Maleness was aligned with active, determinate, and defining form; femaleness with mere passive, indeterminate, and inferior matter. Plato, in the Timaeus, compared the defining aspect of form with the father, and indefinite matter with the mother; Aristotle also compared the form/matter distinction with the male/female distinction. To quote Lloyd again, "This comparison . . . meant that the very nature of knowledge was implicitly associated with the extrusion of what was symbolically associated with the feminine."7 thought to be moral knowledge as well as what has been thought to be scientific knowledge, and what has been thought to be the practice of morality. The associations between the philosophical concepts and gender cannot be merely dropped, and the concepts retained regardless of gender, because gender has been built into them in such a way that without it, they will have to be different concepts. As feminists repeatedly show, if the concept of "human" were built on what we think about "woman" rather than what we think about "man," it would be a very different concept. Ethics, thus, has not been a search for universal, or truly human guidance, but a gender-biased enterprise.

Second is the constructed distinction between the public and the private. Masculine identities are able to engage in rational discourse to shape the outcome of the public deliberation that shape politics whereas its opposite is then relegated to the private sphere of the home.

Weintraub (Public and Rrivate in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy, University of Chicago Press 1997, The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, Jeff Weintraub)

One way or another, one of the significant contributions of feminist treatments of the public/private distinction has been to greatly extend the range of people who are aware of the insights to be gained by linking the "private" to the family-rather than, say, to the market or to the isolated individual. In a sense, however, it is odd that this perspective had to be recovered, since it is, so to speak, the one with which [Since Aristotle, in] Western social and political theory began. In Aristotle, for example, the distinction between "private" and "public" is fundamentally that between the household (the vikos) and the political community-with the household seen as a realm of both particularistic ties and "natural" inequality. [and] [t]he "public" space of the polis, on the other hand, is [as] a sphere of wider engagement and fundamental equality in the practice of citizenship. Men (or, at least, citizens) have the ability to move between these two realms; and one of the [basis] bases of the citizen`s public, civic personality is his private personality as a head of household. Women (like children and slaves), however, belong "naturally," and exclusively, in private life. Variations on this model have remained influential in political theory for the subsequent 2,500 years." In the last several centuries, however, it has been overlaid and often displaced by the alternative frameworks this essay has been examining.

And this public/private dichotomy has been used specifically to justify domestic violence, but also to shield batterers from prosecution, punishment, and social accountability.

Morrissey 1: Belinda Morrissey, *When Women Kill: Questions of Agency and Subjectivity* (London: Routledge, 2003)

Batterers are protected from the consequences of their actions largely because of the doctrine of the public/private split which has been entrenched in Western legal thought for centuries. This doctrine entails the division of society into two spheres: the public realm of work, politics and law, and the private realm of home and family. In the purest formulation of this theory the state is not considered to have any ethical or moral right to intervene in anything which happens within the private sphere. Although modern Western societies have modified these beliefs so that the state can and does concern itself in much of what is deemed private, [12](http://www.questia.com/read/107623421" \t "_blank)the home is, nevertheless, still viewed as the private domain of its residents. The laws of privacy reinforce this understanding, ensuring that the state can act only in certain, well-specified ways with regard to this sphere.  This dichotomous ideology of public/private has proven the greatest obstacle to societal awareness of the dangers privacy can entail, especially for women and children. [13](http://www.questia.com/read/107623421" \t "_blank)For it is regularly invoked, particularly in cases involving domestic violence, even though, in Lois McNay's terms, 'the relationship between the two realms has become more complex in late-modernity' (2000:70). [14](http://www.questia.com/read/107623421" \t "_blank)Legal reliance on the concept of privacy continues because, as Martha Mahoney so incisively observes, it suits many of the participants in any trial focused on domestic violence, as 'at least four of the fifteen or more actors in an average criminal action - jurors, judges and attorneys - probably will have experienced or committed at least one domestic assault' (1991:14). Not only do social stereotypes of domestic violence abound in courtrooms, then, but personal biases and responses to spousal abuse do as well (Mahoney, 1991:14). Keeping domestic battery a private matter is more entrenched in the legal and social psyches than the numerous public and legal education campaigns insisting on the opening up of the private to public scrutiny would suggest.

**CONTENTION TWO** is a problematization of the patriarchal assumptions within the discourses of rationality, the public/private dichotomy, and the law. The discourses outlined above influence the legal systems understanding of domestic violence and a deadly response to it. These discourses view the act of killing an abuser as part of a psychological illness as a guise to obscure society’s role in causing the violence in the first place and to protect patriarchal interests.

Morrissey 2:

Another major sticking point for many commentators is the concept of 'learned helplessness'. This trait presents battered women as 'women without wills', according to Donald Downs, thus compromising their equal citizenship through a denial of their agency and individuation (1996:11). For BWS theory has no discourse of responsibility, preferring simply to deny the intentionality of any and all battered women who kill (Downs, 1996:12). [19](http://www.questia.com/read/107623422" \t "_top)The concept of learned helplessness is also deeply paradoxical. It portrays the battered woman as, on the one hand, unable to accurately perceive the abuser, her situation and her possible options for ending the relationship, which undermines the reasonableness of her beliefs regarding the necessity of murder; while on the other, it apparently provides her with such acute powers of discrimination that she is super-aware of the danger she faces and the consequences for herself if she doesn't strike first (Schopp, 1998:103-4, 106). Many battered women who kill don't subscribe to the theory of learned helplessness either. [i]nstead, they claim they felt *hopeless* at times because they [didn’t] were unable to receive the external assistance they required to help them escape their domestic abuse (Busch, 1998:57). As Martha Mahoney observes, then, perhaps learned helplessness is not so much a trait of the battered woman, as of the support agencies and others who are supposed to aid her efforts to leave her violent partner (1991:61). Regardless of these dilemmas, B[attered] W[oman] S[yndrome] has had great appeal for Western courts in their attempts to understand and to explain the behaviour of battered women who kill. Ngaire Naffine argues that such explanation is deemed necessary because women's lives in general are considered exceptional in legal discourse, as beyond the conception of the life of the reasonable male legal subject. Furthermore, *battered* women's lives are considered even more extraordinary because of the historically persistent denial of the extent and the severity of domestic abuse (Naffine, 1995:35). Donald Downs claims that the BWS narrative gained popularity in courtrooms so quickly because it reflected dominant social norms with which the legal system was already comfortable (1996:106), [20](http://www.questia.com/read/107623422" \t "_top)providing legal and medical credibility for stereotypes about women's passivity, masochism and their intrinsic responsibility for domestic abuse (Stubbs and Tolmie, 1994:211). BWS testimony further appealed to the judiciary and legal personnel because it gave them an illusion of cast-iron premises upon which to found a picture of who a battered woman truly is. This is a very dangerous situation for battered women. For, as Donald Downs observes: if an abused woman's responses in the relationship [do] not conform exactly to the legal stereotype of a woman suffering from battered woman syndrome, courts [can] find her, by definition, to be neither battered nor reasonable. (1996:11) The campaign to allow B[attered] W[oman] S[yndrome]evidence into court may well have begun with the best of intentions, then, but the theory now seems to be fast becoming [is] a straitjacket which tries to confine[s] the realities of battered women and domestic violence within rigid parameters which do little to challenge society's, or the law's, understandings of spousal abuse, women's violence, female agency and femininity itself.

The problem is that killing an abuser is not an irrational sickness. It is a deliberate and justifiable choice given the realities of the circumstances that targets of domestic violence experience.

Eber

Loraine Patricia Eber [B.A., 1978, San Francisco State University. Member, Third Year Class. "The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or be Killed" Hastings Law Journal. Vol. 32. 1981]

The typical battered wife has called the police on several occasions and chances are that they have done little more than tell her husband to walk around the block to cool off or advised the wife to spend the night at a friend's house. If the battered wife has been able to convince the police to arrest her husband, then she [is] has been burdened with the district attorney's pressure[d] to drop the charges or a mandatory diversion to the family bureau. If her case has survived to trial and conviction, her husband probably received only a light punishment. Perhaps the battered wife has gone [she went] through all the paperwork and expense of getting a TR[estraining] O[rder] only to have the police tell her that they cannot enforce the order because it is a civil matter. It is easy to argue that all a battered wife has to do is to leave her husband and her constant terror would end. But, emotional and economic [D]ependency as well as [and] practical obstacles preclude [leaving home.] this easy option for some women. Furthermore, [O]ften the husband's threats and beatings do not end when the woman moves out. With all this in mind, the woman in the hypothetical knew that she had exhausted her options and had to face the terrifying reality that her husband was going to kill her eventually unless she struck out first. Thus, from the perspective of the battered wife, the danger is constantly "immediate." Given this perspective, it makes little sense for the law to excuse the wife's killing if it occurs while she is being beaten, but to find her guilty of murder if she kills during a temporary respite between beatings. In both instances [T]he motive [is] may be the same-to prevent the eventuality of the wife's husband killing her.

And this is born out in domestic violence statistics – those suffering domestic violence are likely to experience life-threatening violence.

Serran and Firestone:

Geris SERRAN AND Philip FIRESTONE [School of Psychology, University of Ottawa, Department of Psychiatry, University of Ottawa]“Intimate partner homicide: a review of the male proprietariness and the self-defense theories” [Aggression and Violent Behavior](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/science/journal/13591789) [Volume 9, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/science/journal/13591789/9/1), January–February 2004, Pages 1–15

[Browne (1987)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178902001076#BIB10) notes that although there exists more of a focus on violence within families and books documenting the experiences of the ‘battered woman,’ little is known about the progression of violence, or those cases that result in death. Women generally do not kill, but [W]hen [women kill] they do, it is often in their own defense. A review of police records on spousal homicides in Canada found that the majority of women who killed their partners were beaten by them [(Chimbos, 1978)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178902001076#BIB13). Similarly, Totman (1978), studying women in a California State Prison, reported that of 30 women who had killed their partners, 29 had been abused by them. In Campbell's (1992) sample of female-perpetrated homicides where the victim was a current or estranged husband or boyfriend, male victims had beaten their partners in 79% of the cases. In her sample, only three women had killed their partners without a history of being battered and without their partners precipitating the killing through violence or the threat of violence. [Grant (1995)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178902001076#BIB32) interviewed 13 women, ranging in age from 26 to 65 years of age who were convicted for the manslaughter of their intimate partners. Grant attempted to determine the women's perceptions of their experiences with their partners that resulted in either the death or serious injury of that person. The women described the killing as trying to stop the violence against them. Many of the women were threatened with their own death at the time of the killing and believed their own death was inevitable. [Polk (1994)](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178902001076#BIB41) examined 12 case studies and concluded that in 8 of the 12 cases, women had killed their sexual partners in response to the violence of the man. In only two cases was the killing in response to the threat of the man leaving, and no cases resulted out of jealousy on the part of the woman. These findings are supported by other researchers [[Browne, 1987]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178902001076#BIB10), [[Daly & Wilson, 1988]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178902001076#BIB18) and [[Willbanks, 1983]](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/science/article/pii/S1359178902001076#BIB55).

**CONTENTION THREE** is that affirming explodes the discourses of patriarchy by allowing non-masculine identities to place their own interests above the violence of patriarchial domination. Recognizing the intentionality of the use of deadly force in response to domestic violence is critical in this challenge.

Morrissey 3:

The proof that a battered woman's killing of her partner was a reasonable act under the circumstances relies on many elements which exist outside legal discourse. A woman who kills her male partner threatens the social fabric of her culture; such an act [and] disturbs, challenges and questions the modern Western incarnations of the ideologies of family, marriage and heterosexuality. The role of women in Western societies is likewise queried. Women have long been socialized to think of others before themselves; to value nurturance, love and care at the expense of autonomy and independence; to have a weaker, more fluid sense of self than the strong ego boundaries associated with traditional masculine selves. [26](http://www.questia.com/read/107623422" \t "_blank)A woman who kills asserts a self dedicated to placing herself first. Mrs R., Pamela Sainsbury and Erika Kontinnen asserted selves more concerned with their personal need for themselves and their families to live and be free of abuse than with [before] their partners' need to dominate. Mrs R.'s acts, in particular, have still further implications. In her insistence, common to many [B]attered women who kill, that she had good reason to kill her partner, she imparts a potentially revolutionary message, dangerous in Western societies still dominated by major institutions such as law or media founded on patriarchal principles.

Challenging patriarchy through recognizing the morally legitimate deliberate use of deadly force necessitates new legal and social discourses that allow for a non-masculine way of understanding and defining citizenship.

Morrissey 4:

Battered women who kill require the possibility of a new legal narrative which would uphold their claims of self-defence and make semiotic rehabilitation unimportant. This narrative would base representation upon a concept of determined agency whereby battered women would be considered to have made a rational choice in killing abusive, life-threatening partners, yet to have been coerced into that decision through a lack of societal support and recognition of their situation. An emphasis on societal responsibilities in forestalling such crimes of desperation would then problematize the public/private split, insisting that although privacy requires protection it should not also shield male criminal behaviour. This self-defence narrative would portray[s] battered women agentically yet also contextualize[s] their actions within their class, race, ethnic and cultural backgrounds and within a more general analysis of gendered oppression in Western heteropatriarchal societies. Recuperation would thus become unnecessary, as battered women who kill would not be considered to have acted unreasonably, nor to have stepped outside the realm of the human in the first place. Instead, they would be regarded as having taken necessary, justifiable action to protect their own physical and/or psychical health. Moreover, battered women's homicide narratives would no longer require the currently inevitable legal translation of feminine agency and responsibility into masculine understandings of irrationality and provocation. Finally, battered women would be able to tell their own stories to courts which could listen.

This opens the space for a radically inclusive feminism that respects all feminisms, as long as their foundational principles all rest on the agentic self-determination of non-masculine identities. Any one affirming the topic can, and should, stand in solidarity with this movement.

Eisenstein

Zillah R Eisenstein., Professor of Politics at Ithaca College in New York, Against Empire, p. 5, 2004. <http://ithaca.edu/zillah/chapter%207.pdf>

Women activists need to radically pluralize, rather than liberally pluralize, the concept of feminisms. This means that differences will not be silenced in some hierarchically privileged order against a singular standard, or set up oppositionally against each other. This means [and] that differences of power must be recognized and challenged. The structures of power have to be dismantled so that differences simply express variety and can be earnestly embraced as such.6 There [are] will be a variety of ways that women’s equality, freedom, and justice are expressed and defended; as long as self-determination–which encompasses individual choices and access (equality) to them exists as part of this process. So, feminisms belong to anyone who is committed to women’s ability to choose their destiny; to be the agent of their own life choices as long as they do not colonize another. As such, no one simply owns feminisms particular meaning. Naming acknowledges the thing named so that it can be seen. Naming ends silence. Naming also expresses the power of those who get to name. It is part of the very process of self-determination that is so central to feminism itself. Toni Morrison in Beloved writes: “Definitions belonged to the definers–not the defined”.7 Feminism locates the sites of women’s oppression as visible. There are differing notions of what oppression means, yet `feminism’ gives coherence to the variety. Women, especially in `the’ West, need to multiply the versions/visions of women’s oppression and liberation; and find multiple ways to understand the varieties of feminisms.

**AT: Excuse**

The legal and moral assumptions embedded in excusing deliberate deadly force reinscribes patriarchal assumptions. It ignores that the decision to kill abusers is an agentic, rightful decision to place one’s life over the interests of the abuser. Excuse furthers the narrative that non-masculine identities must be inherently irrational, and their actions can neither be reasonable or necessary.

Morrisey

Regardless of their modification, however, the defences of provocation and self-defence still tend to accommodate situations men find intolerable in either their domestic or their public relationships. Certainly, in both instances, the provocative or threatening behaviour on the part of men has to be a great deal more intense for women who kill to take advantage of these defences, than it needs to be when men kill their female partners. Women's experience of constant brutality and intimidation cannot compare in terms of destructiveness with situations men find provocative, such as threatened or actual separation or infidelity. The modifications to both defences have gone some way to redressing the masculinist bias of these defences, but they have by no means introduced a level playing field for men and women in respect of their usage. The most important differences between the defences of provocation, diminished responsibility and self-defence, apart from their obvious legal outcomes, are that the first two function as excuses, while the last operates as a justification. Excuse defences merely mitigate the penalties for acts which are deemed essentially wrongful and 'inherently irrational', ensuing from loss of control (Tarrant, 1990:150). Justification defences, on the other hand, defend 'rational, necessary killings' (Tarrant, 1990:148) which are inherently rightful. A justification defence presents the *act* as appropriate and reasonable, while an excuse defence presents the *actor* as inherently irrational and the act as not to be publicly encouraged or defended (Busch, 1999:17; Downs, 1996:9).

Prefer this evidence to theirs because it is far more specific on the questions of the assumptions embedded in within the excuse/justification distinction – don’t let them just say that their argument doesn’t provide an additional link to my criticism when this SPECIFICALLY says that it does.

Second, their analysis and evidence says nothing about challenging the structure of patriarchy. Even if they have some kind of utilitarian net benefit, that doesn’t have anything to deal with challenging the underlying patriarchal structures that cause domestic violence that we should talk about.

AT: Util

First, utilitarian arguments about impacts to women specifically do not engage directly with my framework about challenging patriarchy. Even if it is true that there are harms that disproportionately affect women, this does not mean that they challenge the underlying assumptions that cause things like domestic violence to begin with. This means that their standards analysis does not fit within my interpretation in my framework of how we should relate to the civil society space of a debate round, and my impacts should always come first.

Second, even if util comes first, challenging patriarchy is necessary because its drive to dominate causes untold destruction that outweighs the neg.

Nhanenge (Jytte, Masters @ U South Africa, Accepted Thesis Paper for Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT”, 2007)

The [A]ndrocentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. …Continued… Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust.

I am the only one that does anything to challenge patriarchy as an ideological structure, so I am the only one that has a risk of solving nuclear destruction, which is the largest impact.